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Este texto ofrece una visión distinta de las explicaciones usuales del cambio en la gestión pública
en México, las cuales se basan en el análisis de decisiones “trascendentales” y explicaciones de corto
plazo.  Contrario a ello, hay un esfuerzo explícito por explicar los cambios en el sector público en función
de procesos de largo plazo en la economía política.  En concreto, muestro cómo diferentes procesos de
cambio han tenido lugar en el sector público mexicano en forma de adaptaciones graduales a los procesos
de liberalización económica y de democratización, con episodios específicos de reforma.  La hipótesis
central es que los cambios en el tamaño y el alcance económico del sector público se explican por cambios
en la estrategia económica del gobierno, en tanto que los cambios en la estructura y la selección de
políticas de gestión pública se explican por el proceso de democratización política.
El objetivo general de esta investigación es mejorar nuestra comprensión de la dinámica del cambio
institucional en las estructuras gubernamentales, al enfatizar la distinción entre reformas deliberadas y
cambio incremental, y al ligar ambos procesos a transformaciones de mayor alcance en las esferas política
y económica.
Palabras claves: Nuevo Institucionalismo, Reforma Administrativa, Democratización, Liberalización,
Cambio Institucional, México.
This paper argues against prevailing explanations of public management change in Mexico that rely
on analysis of “momentous” decisions and short term explanations of reform.  In contrast, there is an
explicit attempt to explain changes in the public sector by long-term developments in the political economy.
 Specifically, I will show how different processes of change have taken place in the Mexican public sector
as a gradual adaptation to the processes of economic liberalization and democratization, punctuatted by
specific reform efforts.  The main hypothesis is that changes in the size and economic scope of the public
sector are explained by changes in the government’s economic strategy, whereas the changes in structure
and public management policy choices are better explained by the process of political democratization.
The overall objetive of this research is to improve our understanding of the dynamics of institutional
change in government structures, by emphasizing the distinction  between deliberate reform and incremental
change, and by linking both processes to broader developments in the political and economic spheres.
Keywords: new institutionalism, administrative refor, democratization, liberalization, institutional change,
México.
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1. Introduction
The transformations that have occurred in Mexico during the last two decades have significantly
altered the political and economic conditions of the country. Mexico has moved from an economic
model based on import substitution to an export oriented economy, and from an authoritarian
system based on the dominance of one party to a multiparty competitive democracy. These
transformations have triggered dramatic changes in other areas of the Mexican political economy,
including the links between business and the state, the interaction between local, state and
federal governments, patterns of political participation, and even international relations. In terms
of public administration, these changes have had an enormous effect on the structure and
operation of the public sector1.   Indeed, after more than two decades of transformations, the
Mexican public sector is not only smaller, but also substantially different from that of 19822.
How can we account for these changes in the Mexican public administration? Scholarly
work on comparative public administration tends to pay attention to focal events (mainly in the
form of reform initiatives or authoritative decisions by central governments). Furthermore, as
Pierson (2004) has explained in his critique of social science’s bias towards short term explanations,
analysts usually identify immediate causes of social events, rather than slow-moving and
cumulative explanations for public policy outcomes. To counter both biases –towards ‘momentous’
decisions and short term explanations–, in this paper there is an explicit attempt to explain
changes in the public sector by long-term developments in the political economy. Moreover, in
accordance with recent works on institutional change (Thelen, 2004; Campbell, 2005), there is
also an effort to understand change not only in terms of reform, but also in terms of evolution
and adaptation. I will show how different processes of change have taken place in the Mexican
public sector, with a gradual adaptation to these two big transformations, punctuated by specific
reform effort that reinforce slow-moving trends.
In this paper, I will also argue against the common argument (especially among non-Mexican
analysts) which ascribes many of the changes in the structure and functioning of the public
sector to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and/or to the victory Vicente Fox
1 Understanding the extent to which the public sector has changed in the last two decades is relevant not only for
the study of public administration, but also to the analysis of the political economy of Mexico. The public sector is
significant to the political economy of any country both as a bureaucratic entity with interests and strategies, and as
an economic agent with an impact (both positive and negative) on the national economy. Any attempt to understand
events such as the debt and peso crises of 1982 and 1995 needs to take into account the role of the public sector as
an economic entity. Similarly, the political changes that have occurred in the last twenty years cannot be explained
without references to the public sector as a political actor (or, to be sure, a set of political actors within an institutional
setting). Nevertheless, the public sector is not only a causal factor for developments in other arenas. It has also gone
through a radical overhaul that calls for an explanation.
2 For the purposes of this paper, when referring to the Mexican public sector, I will deal exclusively with the Federal
Public Administration. The state and municipal spheres have followed different, and increasingly autonomous, paths;
see, for instance, Diaz Cayeros (1995); and Cabrero (2001).
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in the presidential election of 2000, which ended seven decades of government by the same
party. It is a widespread assumption to identify these two events (in 1994 and 2000, respectively)
as causes, rather than the culmination of pre-existing trends (see, for instance, Meacham, 1999;
Muller and Gutiérrez, 2005; Borins, 2002). Similarly, it is a common mistake to associate change
in the public sector to “policy transfers” imposed from abroad, rather than to domestic pressures
(Bissesar, 2002, Nickson, 2002; Nef 2003; McCourt and Minogue, 2001). By looking at the
sequence in which changes in the Mexican public administration occurred, I will claim that most
of them took place prior to those momentous events, and that they were a response to domestic
pressures3.
However, a mere chronological account would be insufficient for explaining why and how
the public sector has been transformed in the last two decades. Thus, this paper addresses the
general question of why the Mexican public sector has experienced such a dramatic transformation
in size, structures and policy management priorities. With that objective, in the first section there
will be a panoramic outline of the sharp contrast between the structure of the federal public
administration in 1982 and in 2006. This section will be followed by a brief review of theoretical
works on institutional change and public management policy, which will provide the basis for
the empirical analysis of two decades of change in the public sector. In order to explain why
these changes have taken place, in the next sections, I will turn to the analysis of quantitative
changes (indicators of public sector size), and qualitative transformations (in terms of structures,
personnel and policy issues). My main hypothesis is that changes in the size and economic
scope of the public sector are explained by the government’s economic strategy (during the
1980s, particularly after 1985), whereas the changes in structure and public management policy
choices (Barzelay, 2001) are better explained by the process of political democratization. It is
not my purpose to evaluate these changes and reforms in terms of what they have achieved4,
or to detail the decision-making processes that lead to them5.  The objective is to analyze the
timing of these changes, and the factors that explain them. The overall objective of this research
is to improve our understanding of the dynamics of institutional change in government structures,
by emphasizing the distinction between deliberate reform and incremental change, and by linking
both processes to broader developments in the political and economic spheres.  
3 Another common mistake is to give credit for these changes to the New Public Management movement. For a
critique of this position, see Cejudo (forthcoming).
4 The inherent difficulties in any kind of evaluation are discussed in Boyne (2003) and Boston (2001).
5 For an analysis of decision making processes of public management reform in Mexico see Cejudo (2003). Similarly,
a case study of a failed attempt to reform the civil service can be found in Guerrero (2000).
2. A Striking Contrast
As a result of a long trend that may be traced to the end of the Mexican revolution (and that
was reinforced under the administrations of Luis Echeverría [1970-76] and José López Portillo
[1976-82]), the Mexican public sector in the early 1980s had significantly expanded its economic
role and had centralized most of the governmental expenditure at the federal level. For instance,
by the end of 1982 the total public sector expenditure accounted for 41% of GDP (Giugale et
al., 2000)6, and the government directly owned 1,115 public enterprises (including the recently
nationalized banking system) (Rogosinzki, 1993). This year was also the zenith of a long process
of centralization of resources: 90.7% of government expenditure was spent at the federal level,
leaving less than ten percent for the state and municipal levels (Centro Nacional de Estudios
Municipales, 1985). Finally, in a first indication of the unsustainability of the economic model
(Grayson, 1994) and, above all, of the inadequate macroeconomic management (Lustig, 1988),
the fiscal deficit for that year was 15.9% of GDP (Giugale et al., 2000).
In clear contrast, the same indicators for 2006 show a significantly reduced federal public
sector: government spending as percentage of GDP was 22.4% (one of the lowest among OECD
member countries); the number of public enterprises was reduced to 173, and the proportion
of government expenditure at the federal level was reduced in one third to 59.2 percent.
Significantly, after being a source of economic pressures during the 1980s, public deficit for the
last five years has been lower than 1 percent.
But there have also been notable qualitative changes in addition to these quantitative
indicators. In response to a changing political environment, new priorities in public management
have emerged. Whereas in the early 1980s the key issues in terms of public management policy
choices were related to the functions of planning and control in the federal public administration,
in the last years there has been a shift towards the policy areas of civil service and human
resource management, and accountability and transparency. Similarly, the structure of the federal
government has changed significantly: there are new ministries (for social policy and for
environment policy), and old ones have been integrated to others (SPP to the Secretariat of
Finance –Hacienda— and the General Comptrollership, after changes in 1994 and 2003, has
become Secretaría de la Función Pública, with a much broader mandate that includes administrative
development and human resource management). Finally, as it will be shown in the following
sections, the impetus for concentration that dominated the public sector during the early 1980s
has been eroded, and replaced by a new impulse towards decentralization.
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6 This was, to be sure, an exceptional year, because the macroeconomic conditions were exceptional as well (Lustig,
1998). However, this year was the culmination of a trend, and the beginning of a policy reversal. Its exceptional character
is what makes it more significant for the purposes of this paper.
Naturally, a description of contrasting data is not enough for explaining the process of
dramatic transformation in the Mexican public sector. It is necessary to know what have been
the causes behind those changes. Alternative explanations point to different directions: scholars
with an interest on economic issues argue that changes in the public sector are better explained
if we understand those changes as responses to the economic challenges of these two decades
(Lustig, 1998; Pastor and Wise, 1999). Other scholars identify political explanations, such as
institutional constraints (Pardo, 1992, 2003) or the interests of the political and bureaucratic
elites (Heredia, 2002). However, as I will argue in the following sections, not all changes have
responded to the same logic: changes on the size of the state and its economic role have been
a reaction to economic pressures, and a policy-spillover of changes in economic policy; while
changes in policy issues and administrative rules and routines are more a reaction to the process
of democratization7.
3. Making Sense of Change
In his recent Politics in Time, Pierson (2004) argues that contemporary social scientists tend
to focus on short time horizons when looking for effects and causes, despite the fact that many
(if not most) social processes take a long time to unfold. He identifies three types of social
processes that are “slow-moving”: cumulative effects (when change is continuous but gradual),
threshold effects (when cumulative forces need to reach a critical level to unleash change), and
causal chains (when instead of a direct relationship [xy], there is a sequence of causal relationships
[abcde], which Pierson calls “multi-stage” causal processes). In all three cases, only with a long-
term perspective will it be possible to understand the process of institutional change. Otherwise,
a short-term focus will lead researchers to point out to the wrong causes, by choosing an
explanatory variable just because it is close in time to the outcome under analysis.
From a different perspective, but with a shared interest in explaining institutional change,
Kathleen Thelen, in various scholarly works (Thelen 2004; Thelen and Streeck, 2005), has
repeatedly argued against explanations for institutional change that place too much attention
to deliberate attempts for reform, over other processes of institutional change that do not require
conscious efforts for change. From her point of view, most scholarly explanations of institutional
change rely on accounts of “punctuated equilibrium” trajectories that start with a “critical juncture”.
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7 There are other ways of looking at these processes of change. Standard political economy explanations of public
sector change in Mexico tend to emphasize changes in the government elites, and argue that the increase in the relative
power of “technocrats” vis-à-vis traditional politicians (Centeno, 1994; Thacker, 2000) and the arrival of a new political
group after the 2000 election is what explains the decisions to reform the public sector (Heredia, 2002; Camp, 2002).
This paper offers an alternative view, which does not necessarily rejects the importance of actors and their relative
power, but that focuses on other units of analysis: the reform decisions and processes adaptation to changing environment.
From this perspective, institutions and policies enjoy long periods of stability, that are interrupted
by exogenous shocks (whether by changes in the environment or by deliberate decision for
reform) that lead to radical transformation8. However, she convincingly argues that institutions
change not only through conscious reform efforts, but also through other processes, such as
evolution or adaptation9.  In other words, not all change is rapid and deliberate, and, conversely,
lack of reform does not mean stability. The main lesson from this discussion is that, if scholars
focus exclusively on deliberate reforms, they will be ignoring other sources of change, and,
consequently, they will make causal arguments that will be biased towards explanations that
look for momentous events and critical junctures, such as reforms or dramatic changes in the
environment, rather than evolutionary processes that may be gradual.
Both scholarly biases –the excessive focus on the short term and the emphasis on deliberate
reforms as sources of change– are endemic to the public administration literature. There is a
tendency towards short term explanations that look for immediate causes (and, moreover, to
causes that are easily identified) and a preference for explaining change as the result of deliberate
reform decisions.  These biases are, of course, not only a problem of methodological design
(although this is, certainly, one of the reasons) but also a problem with the theories we use for
explaining change. To put it simply: the academic community is better equipped for explaining
stability and continuity than for explaining change (Peters and Pierre, 1998).
Indeed, scholarly work on comparative public administration tends to focus on the analysis
of the immediate and direct causes and effects of deliberate reforms. A very different source
of change –the adaptation to an evolving environment– is usually downplayed, among other
reasons because it is more difficult to grasp analytically. Moreover, the causal mechanisms
linking broader transformations in the political economy of one country to concrete changes in
the structure and functioning of the public sector are not as evident as those that are the outcomes
of government reforms. Still, recent scholarship on institutional explanations of public sector
change has moved towards using processes of change instead of reform as unit of analysis.
Specifically, as Barzelay and Gallego (2006) have explained, if the purpose is to explain change
in the institutional rules and organizational routines of government-wide administrative practice
(Barzelay’s [2001] definition of public management policies), it is necessary to take into account
three complementary explanations: “highly visible discrete public management policy choices;
discrete choices that move public management policymaking from one partial equilibrium situation
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8 For a similar account of change from a sociological perspective, see Clemens (1999).
9 This position is in clear conflict with what Cappocia and Kelemen (2006: 4) call a “dualist conception of political
and institutional development, based on an alternation between moments of fluidity and rapid change and longer phases
of relative stability and institutional reproduction [which] has a venerable pedigree in social sciences and political history”.
to another; and, trajectories of low-visibility adaptations of public management policies” (Barzelay
and Gallego, 2006: 542-3). Overall, this disciplinary turn in the study of public management
involves a more sophisticated understanding of institutional change, which –as these authors
emphasize– needs to be part of a dialogue with these broader debates in institutionalist theory.
Considering these contemporary discussions of institutional change, in the following pages
there is an attempt to explain change in the Mexican public sector with a long term perspective
and avoiding explanations that look for momentous events and, instead, identifies transformations
that are gradual and slow-moving, but with dramatic effects.
4. Changes in the Public Sector in Response to the Economic Crisis
There are disagreements about to what extent the debt crisis in 1982 was a result of inherent
flaws in the development model (Grayson, 1994), or of macroeconomic mismanagement (Lustig,
1998). What is clear is that the nationalization of the banking system, announced by the
government in September 1982, became a final blow to the capacity of the Mexican state for
dealing effectively with adverse economic conditions, not because of its financial costs, but
because of the loss in business confidence. However, initial responses to the crisis were based
on the assumption that the economic problems could be solved in the short run, with minor
adjustments in the economic policy.
Still, as Lustig (1998: 111) suggests:
[…] the 1982 crisis brought to the forefront the discussion of the efficacy of the state in
handling economic matters. The crisis and adjustment process provided and opportunity
to streamline the bureaucracy, improve the public sector’s revenue-collection and
expenditure mechanisms, and redefine the nature and extent of state participation in
the economy. Fiscal policy, administrative reform, decentralization, divestiture of public
enterprises, and the elimination or relaxation of ownership, price-setting, and trade
restrictions (that is, deregulation) became the core ingredients of public sector reform.
Yet, it could be argued that it was only in 1985 that a policy reversal took place. After the
failure of minor adjustments initiated in 1982, De la Madrid announced a comprehensive package
of reforms that included privatization of some public enterprises, deregulation, and reduction
on the size of the budget (Aguilar, 1994). It was not only a decrease in public investment (the
traditional way of reducing the budget); in fact, most of the cuts affected current expenditure,
and included layoffs of public officials.  Even if these were rather small changes (compared to
those achieved in the following decade) they were, indeed, a significant reversal to the trends
in the previous decades, and they were the beginning of a dramatic transformation in the role
of the public sector in the economy.
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As shown in figure 1, the size of the public sector declined since 1982, but, in view of the
fact that these initial measures were unsuccessful in overcoming the economic crisis, they
required more drastic decisions from the government, particularly after 1988 (Cornelius, 1986).
But the economic crisis is only part of the explanation. These changes in the public sector were
not only the result of gradual adaptation of the bureaucracy to new environmental conditions,
but also the consequence of discrete policy decisions in the economic policy arena, that –even
if they were not deliberate public management policies– had a significant impact in the size of
the public sector. These decisions were associated to the rise of a new political elite, mainly
composed of economist, who had a different set of policy solutions that relied more on the power
of the market than on state intervention (see Hernández, 1989; Centeno, 1994; Camp, 2002).
By 1985, this team, headed by Carlos Salinas in the Secretariat of Programming and Budget,
had already won several bureaucratic struggles with other ministries (mainly Hacienda), and
had convinced the president of the “inevitability” of market-oriented reforms (see Torres, 1999).
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FIGURE 1:  Total Public Sector Spending as percentage of GDP
Source: For 1980-1989: Mexico. A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era. Edited
by M. Giugale, O. Lafourcade, and V. Nguyen, World Bank, 2000. For 1990-2006: “Gasto público
como porcentaje del PIB”, Sexto Informe de Gobierno. Presidency of Mexico, 2006. Information for
2006 is a preliminary figure.
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FIGURE 2:  Overall deficit as percentage of GDP
Sources: For 1980-2000: Mexico. A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era. Edited
by M. Giugale, O. Lafourcade, and V. Nguyen, World Bank, 2000. For 2001-2006: “Balance público
y balance económico primario como porcentajes del PIB”, Sexto Informe de Gobierno. Presidency
of Mexico, 2006. Information for 2006 is a preliminary figure.
These measures were reinforced by the government’s commitments as part of the Pact of
Economic Solidarity signed with labor and business organizations aimed at controlling inflation:
“In January 1988, as part of the so-called Pact of Economic Solidarity, the government signed
an ‘Austerity Deal’ which included the reduction of current expenditure, and the lay-off of 13,000
non-unionised public servants, and the initiation of a early retirement programme for unionised
workers” (Aguilar, 1994: 156-157).
As a direct result of this new set of priorities, in the second half of his administration, De la
Madrid announced, under the label of Redimensionamiento del Estado, significant cuts in public
employment, a reduction in the size of several government agencies, and the privatization of
public enterprises. One of the results of this decision was the reduction in the public deficit, as
shown in figure 2, and in the number of public enterprises, as shown in figure 3.  At the end of
the De la Madrid’s term in office, he announced that the number of public employees had been
reduced by one percent, and that 1,574 offices had been cancelled. This was the result not only
of the initial measures of 1985, but also some further decisions taken as a response to the 1987
rising in inflation rates and problems in the stock exchange.
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Thus, we can argue that a combination of economic pressures that demanded solutions
and the rise of a team of young technocrats willing to provide their own set of solutions is what
explains these initial changes in the public sector. The following administration, under Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, followed the same track, but with a more radical transformation in mind.
Privatization efforts were not longer reduced to small and unimportant assets, but turned to
telecommunications, banks, and other sectors previously defined as ‘strategic’ (Serrano and
Boulmer-Thomas, 1996; Méndez, 1994)10.  Similarly, the Salinas administration managed to
achieve a balanced budget, through tax reforms and privatizations.
Hence, when Salinas decided to initiate negotiations for a Free-Trade Agreement with the
United States, most of the changes in the size and economic profile of public sector had already
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10 It must be mentioned that even those enterprises that remained in the public sector have undertaken significant
administrative and financial restructuring (Lustig, 1998: 112).
Sources: For years 1982-1989: J. Rogozinski and F. Casas Guzmán (1993), “El proceso de
desincorporación en México”, in La administración pública contemporánea en México. Mexico City:
SECOGEF-FCE. For 1990-2006: “Desincorporación y creación de entidades paraestatales”, Sexto
Informe de Gobierno. Presidency of Mexico, 2006.
FIGURE 3:  Number of public enterprises
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taken place. The processes initiated during the 1980s achieved most of its results by the early
1990s. The economic constraints posed by the economic crisis, and the neo-liberal agenda
pushed by the new technocratic elite had already transformed the public sector before NAFTA
was negotiated. First, as a consequence of the privatization and downsizing processes initiated
during the De la Madrid administration, the Mexican public sector was no longer a major
participant in the economy (at least not as important as it used to be in the 1970s). And, second,
as a result of a significant re-structuring of public finances, the public sector was no longer a
source of instability in the economy. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show that, by 1991, most of the
characteristics of today’s public sector (in terms of size and economic importance) were already
defined by previous changes. In any case, NAFTA reinforced certain patterns of coalitions
between some members of the government’s financial team and big businesses (Thacker, 2000),
but, again, this was the consolidation of a trend initiated years before, rather than a new
development. The significance of NAFTA lies, instead, in its function as a mechanism to lock
in these market reforms and increase the costs of their reversal.
These initial transformations were not only aimed at reducing the size and scope of
government. The decision to disappear the Secretariat of Programming and Budget and return
many of its functions to Hacienda, and the constitutional reform to grant autonomy to the Central
Bank were the confirmation that the most important changes to the public sector were already
done, since planning stopped being a key governmental activity (because of the state’s diminished
role in the economy) (Torres, 1999) and the autonomy of the central bank was an attempt to
make a credible commitment to the economic reforms enacted in those years (Ortiz, 1994).
Furthermore, it was an indication that these reforms would not be subject to a reversal (at least
in the short and medium terms). That is why major events such as the passing of NAFTA, the
political turmoil of 1994 (from the Zapatista uprising to the assassinations of Luis Donaldo
Colosio, PRI candidate to the Presidency, and José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, Secretary General
of the same party), the peso crisis of 1995, the congressional elections of 1997, or Fox’s victory
in 2000 did not alter significantly the patterns already established by previous decisions on the
size and economic profile of public sector.
Thus, from a theoretical perspective, we may argue that changes in the size and economic
role of the public sector were the consequence of two distinct, although clearly intertwined,
processes: deliberate reform decisions (mainly in economic policy) that had an spillover effect
on public sector rules and routines, and the gradual adaptation to changes in the environment,
specifically as a result of adverse economic conditions. Yet, as mentioned in the introduction
to this paper, these changes are not the only ones that have occurred in the public sector in the
last decades. Even if its relative size has remained with small changes since the early 1990s,
the public sector has not been immune to the political events of the last years. The next section
deals with this second source of transformations.
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5.   Changes in the Public Sector in Response to Democratization
Alongside the economic revolution underwent during the 1980s and 1990s, a second shift
was taking place in the political arena. The hegemony of the ruling Partido Revolucionario
Institucional was being challenged on several fronts (Loaeza, 1994; Dresser, 1998; Díaz Cayeros
and Magaloni, 2001). Slowly but continuously, opposition parties gained ground at the local and
state level, as well as in the Legislative branch (Lujambio, 1995). In the 1997 elections, the PRI
lost the absolute majority in the Lower Chamber and the government of Mexico City, and in
2000 it lost the Presidency after 70 years in power. This process of democratization, fueled to
a large extent by public discontent with economic policy and corruption allegations, took place
within an evolving institutional framework regulating the electoral competition (Schedler, 2000;
Merino, 2003), as defined by the electoral reforms of the early 1990s, and, particularly, of 1996.
The immediate result of this process was that the government’s capacity to unilaterally
dictate policy without opposition was being severely reduced. Not surprisingly, the public sector
faced several transformations in response to these changing conditions. It also had to react to
new public demands, and, consequently, new issues had to be addressed. Although the economy
continued to be a prominent issue in the agenda (especially during the peso crisis), the public
sector had to respond to the challenges of increasing pressure for decentralization, for transparency
and for an improvement in public management.  Even if Salinas managed to limit these demands
during his administration, it proved to be more difficult for Ernesto Zedillo. Similarly, the Vicente
Fox administration no longer had the unchallenged authority and discretion enjoyed by the old
PRI governments, and had to give way to (and in some cases actively encourage) new public
management policies that were initiated outside the Executive branch.
The arena in which democratization posed initial challenges to the structure and functioning
of the federal public sector was in the allocation of resources across levels of government. As
discussed above, 1982 marked an all-time high in federal expenditure as percent of total
government expenditure. But this trend was reversed by the De la Madrid administration, which
started an important, if limited, decentralization (originated with a constitutional reform in 1983
that granted greater autonomy to local governments). More importantly, after the first gubernatorial
race won by an opposition party (Baja California by the National Action Party in 1988), there
were increasing calls for a reallocation of fiscal resources (Díaz Cayeros, 1995). This has resulted
in new rules for the distribution of government’s money, which has reduced its concentration
at the federal level (see figure 4). 
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In the same way, the government initiated a process of decentralization of different areas
(education under Salinas, health and environmental management under Zedillo, and, in a more
limited way, cultural and social policy under Fox). This process has led not only to more resources
transferred to the states, but also to a reallocation of public personnel (mainly from the health
and education sectors) that are now assigned to the state governments. Municipalities have
also increased their resources and capacity (although the poorest of them have actually gained
little). A new constitutional reform was enacted in 1999 giving them greater autonomy. Moreover,
the fact that electoral competition is now the rule in most of the municipalities has posed new
pressures on local governments, and created new calls for decentralization (Ibarra, Somoano
and Ortega, 2006). Furthermore, the concentration of 1982 has given way to a more fragmented
system, not only because of decentralization towards the state and local government, but also
within the federal government (and, of course, by the increased power of the Congress and the
Judiciary, as well as autonomous institutions such as the Central Bank, the Federal Electoral
Institute, or the National Commission for Human Rights)11.
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FIGURE 4:  Distribution of government expenditure across 
levels of government
Sources: For 1982: Centro Nacional de Estudios Municipales, El desafío municipal. Mexico City:
Secretaría de Gobernación, 1985. For other years: “Estructura del gasto primario”, Sexto Informe
de Gobierno. Presidency of Mexico, 2006. Figures refer to percentage of public resources spent
by the federal government or transferred to state and municipal governments.
11 This has occurred despite an initial, and failed, attempt by the Fox administration of creating coordinating agencies
in the Office of the President. Most of them have already been dismantled.
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A second way in which the process of democratization affected the public sector was in the
introduction of new pressures for transparency and improvement in the delivery of public services.
New issues (environmental policy, for example) gained increased recognition by the government,
which created a new ministry (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca).
More importantly, Salinas’s pet social policy project, PRONASOL, lead to the creation of what
was then called a super-ministry, headed by his close ally Luis Donaldo Colosio: Secretaría de
Desarrollo Social. The mandate of this new agency (as institutional embodiment of PRONASOL)
was to address the growing problem of poverty and inequality12. This program eventually evolved
into a PROGRESA (under Zedillo) and OPORTUNIDADES (under Fox).
In response to these demands for improved government performance, the Zedillo administration
launched an ambitious project of Public Administration Modernization (Programa de Modernización
de la Administración Pública, [SECODAM, 1996]). Carried out by a restructured Contraloría
(renamed Secretaría de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo), this program, despite its
reduced profile, achieved some changes in terms of deregulation, reorganization of human
resources management (Gow and Pardo, 1999; Pardo, 2003), and, more successfully, a reform
in budgetary processes (which was still under way during the Fox administration) (Chávez Presa,
2000).
Facing increasing democratic challenges, the public sector adopted new policies to increase
transparency and accountability (Arellano, 2000). The Mexican Congress created in 1999 a new
Órgano Superior de Fiscalización (National Audit Office), to oversee the effective use of public
resources. In the same way, Contraloría developed an innovative mechanism –Internet-based
Compranet— for making government procurement less discretional and opaque. After the 2000
election, Vicente Fox made corruption a major issue during the presidential campaign, and it
was a prominent item in the government agenda during the first year of his administration, but
it soon lost its high-profile status, without significant achievements.  Yet, this is another area in
which a significant transformation has taken place, but mainly before the 2000 elections. Figure
5 shows the evolution of perception of corruption according to the Transparency International
index. As this figure suggest, the real change occurred before 2000. There have been some
marginal adjustments during the Fox administration, but without any significant improvement13.
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12 It was, as has been suggested by Denisse Dresser, a set of “neopopulist solutions to neoliberal problems” (Dresser,
1991), but it was also a political tool, to be used by the government to improve its performance in the new arena of
electoral competition (Pastor and Wise, 1998).
13 It must be mentioned that other measures of corruption show slow, but constant, improvements during the Fox
administration. See Secretaría de la Función Pública, “Datos básicos sobre México en índice nacionales e
internacionales”,http://www.funcionpublica.gob.mx/indices/doctos/inf_basica_indices_web.doc, consulted on
April 5, 2006. Personal communication from Javier González, Asistant Director General for Public Management at the
Secretaría de la Función Pública.
Corruption in Mexico is still widespread, but apparently not as dramatic at it was before the
1990s. This figure shows that the change from the early 1980s to the late 1990s was more
significant, showing that, in this area as well, despite the official rhetoric, the Fox administration’s
reforms of the public sector have just been a continuation of trend set out in motion in earlier
years.
In this sense, it can be argued that the many changes carried out by the Fox administration
are just the culmination of preexisting trends, rather than a complete overhaul of the administrative
structures. Pressures for decentralization and increased accountability existed not because of
a new government, but as a result of the growing electoral competition, and the reduction of the
government’s discretionary policy-making autonomy –two components of the democratization
process that have been at work since the early 1990s. Both processes of change are explained
better in terms of gradual adjustments than in terms of radical reforms, suggesting that, as the
institutional perspective suggest, if we look exclusively for deliberate reforms as explanations
for change we would be reducing our chances of finding the real causes.
But, at the same time that these slow-moving changes were taking place, there were also
deliberate reform efforts (even if they were not originated in the federal executive but in Congress).
In July 2002, Congress approved a Transparency and Freedom of Information Law (Ley Federal
de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información). This law was the result of a campaign led by a
coalition of print media and civil organizations (known as Grupo Oaxaca), which pushed for
giving citizens access to government information. Despite initial resistance by the Fox administration,
Congress approved this initiative, which has been a useful mechanism for deterring corruption
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FIGURE 5:  Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
Source: Transparency International
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in the federal bureaucracy and giving citizens the right to obtain information about almost any
government activity, and established an autonomous institution in charge of enforcing the law
(the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información) (López Ayllon, 2004). The results have been
positive. Members of Congress consider it the most important achievement of the 2000-2003
period, and, according to a survey carried out by Reforma newspaper, it is perceived as a
significant improvement in the way the government works .
A second reform was the creation of a career civil service system in the federal public
administration. Before 2003, most top- and mid-level public officials were appointed, promoted
and dismissed by discretionary decision, with no legal protection from abuse and no recognition
of their merits and performance. Again, this reform was the result of a congressional initiative
(specifically, by two Senators, one from the PAN and one from the PRI); however, once it was
identified as a reform likely to succeed, the Fox administration got involved in the design of the
bill and lobbied for its approval (personal communication with officials at the Presidential Office,
December 2004). The Civil Service Law (Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera), passed with
no opposition in Congress in 2003 , charged the newly created Ministry for Public Administration
with the responsibility for regulating and implementing the career system. Although the long-
term impact of the law is yet to be seen, so far the basic design is already in place . Secondary
regulation was issued in March 2004, and recruitment has started to take place through competitive
examinations.
In both cases –access to information and civil service–, reforms have been facilitated by
the democratization process of which Fox’s electoral victory in 2000 was a high point rather than
a start. These changes are, in some sense, a continuation of trends initiated by the democratization
process during the 1990s (for instance, the initial decisions to increase accountability during the
Zedillo administration [Cejudo, 2003], and the reorganization of human resources management
in the mid-1990s [Ibarra, 2000]). In this sense, we can identify these reforms as deliberate
decisions that, however, are clearly linked with long-term processes. In other words, both reforms
were a direct consequence of the process of democratization taking place in Mexico, and its
associated pressures for increased accountability and improved performance.
It is, of course, difficult to assess to what extent the transformation of the public sector
analyzed in the previous pages has effectively resulted in improved governance in Mexico.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of six indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2006) that combine several indexes (from numerous different sources) in order to create a
measure of quality of the public sector. Data from this source needs to be taken with a grain of
salt, since these indicators measure Mexico’s rank in global tables, rather than changes in the
value of each indicator, and, furthermore, they are not automatically comparable across time.
Still, it is clear that the changes in most of these variables occurred before 2000, and that, under
the Fox administration, there have been oscillations, rather than dramatic improvements.
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Summing up, just as NAFTA’s effect on the public sector was minimal compared to the
changes triggered by the response to the economic crisis and the growing political power of the
technocratic group, in the same way Fox’s victory’s impact on the public sector is dwarfed by
the earlier effects of the democratization process –both in terms of decentralization pressures
and demands for accountability. The public sector was already more decentralized, less
discretionary and –seemingly—less corrupt in the late nineties than in the early eighties.  After
2000, these trends have just been reinforced and consolidated.
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14 This chart is explained by its authors in the following way: “The governance indicators presented here reflect the
statistical aggregation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think
tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations […] Higher values indicate better governance
ratings. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to account for changes over time in the set of countries covered by the
governance indicators. In the Bar Chart, the statistically likely range of the governance indicator is shown as a thin black
line. For instance, a bar of length 75% with the thin black lines extending from 60% to 85% has the following interpretation:
an estimated 75% of the countries rate worse and an estimated 25% of the countries rate better than the country of
choice. However, at the 90% confidence level, only 60% of the countries rate worse, while only 15% of the countries
rate better.”
FIGURE 6:  Governance indicators 14
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006)
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6. Conclusion: Slow moving changes punctuated by reform efforts
The evolution of the public sector in Mexico has been shaped by the political and economic
transitions of the last two decades. As it has been shown in this paper, the passing of NAFTA
and the end of PRI’s rule in 2000, were not defining moments in terms of their influence on the
public sector, but rather culmination of earlier events. In this paper, I have identified two sources
of change in the public sector: the economic liberalization undertook by the Mexican government
from 1985 on, and the process of democratic opening and gradual erosion of the authoritarian
regime. These transformations had different effects on the public sector, whether by having an
indirect effect on the evolution of public sector, or by inducing deliberate reforms in public
management policies.
The move towards a new economic model imposed two constrains in the public sector. First,
it was decided that the public sector should reduce its economic profile. Consequently, the
government launched ambitious programs of privatization, deregulation and downsizing that
would significantly reduce its size, in terms of its expenditure as percent of GDP, and of the
number of public enterprises and public personnel. And second, the new economic strategy
required that, in order to deal effectively with the crisis, the public sector should stop being a
source of concern for investors. Thus, the economic crisis posed initial pressures on the public
sector, which were reinforced by the decision to change economic model, which shaped a new
economic role for the state and reduced its size.
In the same way, the gradual democratization that started at the local and state level lead
to new demands for decentralization of government functions and resources. More importantly,
the process of democratization had a significant effect in the public sector, because of new
pressures for accountability (in the form of transparency and corruption-control) and improved
performance. The changes in the public sector structure in the early 1990s and the decisions
to create a more professional, open and accountable public sector –through the creation of a
civil service system and of a mechanism to guarantee access to government information– are
a direct effect of the democratization in the political system.
The evidence presented in this paper challenges accounts that give credit for these
transformations to momentous events, while ignoring gradual adjustments. It also challenges
the widespread view according to which changes in the public sector of developing countries
respond to external pressures, rather than domestic demands. The overall argument of this
paper is that changes in the public sector are explained by a combination of slow-moving
adaptations to a new environment and specific reform efforts. In other words, change in the
Mexican administration is the result of slow-moving changes punctuated by deliberate reforms
that, nonetheless, are also associated to the broader processes of economic and political
transformations.
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In this sense, the experience of change in the Mexican public sector sheds light on
contemporary discussions of institutional change in two ways. First, it shows that, as recent
scholarship suggests, change comes from different sources, not only from deliberate reforms.
But, second and more importantly, it also shows that the same driver for change (in this case,
economic liberalization or political democratization) can have an effect on the public sector
through both mechanisms of change, by inducing direct reforms and by having an indirect effect
on the structure and functioning of the public sector via gradual adaptations. Thus, this paper
reinforces the argument that only through the analysis of both short-term reforms and long-term
gradual adaptation processes can we achieve a fuller understanding of the dynamics of public
management change.
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